The Royal Navy
The Battle of Cape Matapan 27th-29th March 1941.

When Italy joined the war on the side of Germany, she had a navy of mostly fairly new ships which had a better general performance than the British Mediterranean Fleet equivalents. The Royal Navy's ships were older. 

At this time Britain had been at war for some 18 months and after the quick surrender by the French to the Germans, and the uncertainty about which side the French Navy would choose to fight on, Britain was in a very precarious position the Mediterranean. The war was not going well for Britain generally and the country's resources were badly overstretched, so even spares were difficult to get and any significant ships losses which might be suffered would be hard to replace. 

Loss of Naval influence in the Mediterranean could have very serious consequences. It was essential therefore to be aggressive and if possible clear the enemy from the arena, to relieve pressure on the British convoys and then increase pressure on the Italian and German ones. 

The British and the Italians had taken different strategic views of Naval requirements. Italy had considered that its big ships should be battleships which in the event of war could be supplied with air cover from land bases and aggressive flying and reconnaissance could also be done from land. The British with a traditionally wider maritime requirement had decided that aircraft carriers were essential for her fleet. 

There had other actions before this one at Matapan took place, for example at sea off Calabria in July 1940, and a significant attack by the British on the Italian Fleet in the harbour of Taranto. 

 For some time it had been the Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham's wish as part of his strategy of aggressive tactics to somehow come to grips with the Italian Navy but since it seemed reluctant in recent months to go to sea this had proved impossible. The only alternative therefore was to attack it in harbour, and a plan was formulated. 

On the night of 11th November 1940, 21 Swordfish aircraft in two waves took off from the aircraft carrier Illustrious which was 170 miles to the south east. The distance was at the limits of these old aircraft, but they were successful and severe damage was done with the loss of two aircraft. The Italian losses were the battleship Conte Di Cavour which was hit and then beached. Although salvaged she took no further part in the war. Two other battleships Littorio and Caio Duilio were damaged and out of action for some months. In terms of cost versus benefit the attack was an outstanding success and the shock inflicted on the Italians in what should have been a secure harbour was considerable. 

It was to be some time after this however, that the fleets would meet at Matapan. 

 The first events of Matapan occured on 27th March 1941, when news of Italian cruisers, which had been ordered to interrupt British convoy traffic, proceeding towards Crete reached A.B Cunningham, Admiral of the Fleet, at Alexandria, Egypt. He decided to put to sea immediately with his battlefleet on the basis that a larger force was likely also to be at sea. The cruiser force under Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell was first ordered to take up station south of Gavdo Island at daylight on 28th March from their position in the Aegean. At the time this was achieved the Battlefleet was steaming north-west from Alexandria, but was some 150 miles away. Admiral Cunningham had managed to keep this movement secret from Italian and other intelligence services and air reconnaissance had not detected it. 

Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell was somewhat unprepared when he sighted the Italian cruiser force, comprising Trieste, Trento, and Bolzano, and decided immediately to withdraw and head south-east in the direction of the British battlefleet. A fight with the more heavily armed Italian ships was deemed too risky at the time, and to draw them towards the RN battlefleet made more sense. Unknown to him a further Italian cruiser force comprising Garibaldi, Abruzzi, Fiume, Pola and Zara was to the north and the battleship Vittorio Veneto was to the west. 

Pridham-Wippell had been seen by the first Italian cruiser group at the same time as he had seen them and they opened fire almost immediately. The engagement lasted about 45 minutes with fire being returned briefly by HMS Gloucester, but neither side scored any hits, although Pridham-Wippell lost one destroyer, HMAS Vendetta, with engine trouble which had to be ordered back to Alexandria. During the engagement both groups were steaming south-east and when the Italians broke it off they turned 180 degrees and returned to a north-west heading, towards the location of their battleship. Pridham-Wippell decide to follow, and now it was his turn to be drawn towards a more powerful enemy unit. 

It has been stated that the Italian combined fleet strength was considerably greater than that of the RN. The Italian fleet was larger and the ships were more modern generally. They had a larger armament and greater speed. However the RN had two more battleships and the aircraft carrier Formidable. 
The speed at which the British battlefleet was travelling was affected by a mechanical problem which developed in HMS Warspite shortly after leaving Alexandria. This could have had significant consequences given the already greater speed of the Italian ships. Problems of communication would also affect both sides, not just the difficulty of actual identification, but of interpretation. Both sides also often discounted good information as inacurate, the most serious being the repeated refusal by Admiral Iachino, the Italian C-in-C to believe that the British battlefleet was anywhere near, or even at sea. 

As it was both sides were approaching each other's positions without certain knowledge of the other and battle would soon be joined. 

Pridham-Wippell was still shadowing the first Italian group unjustifiably confident of his situation when at about 11.00am on the 28th March he came within range of the Vittori Veneto towards which he had been steaming unawares. The Vittorio Veneto opened fire immediately. This caused considerable consternation in the British group, and Pridham-Wippell gave his second order to turn away with all possible speed, making as much smoke as possible. His emergency signals were picked up by the British C-in-C but Pridham-Wippell was in the trap. The first cruiser group now turned back, as previously ordered by Iachino, into his path. Pridham-Wippell's situation was now critical. 

Sometime earlier, Formidable had been ordered to launch a strike force, and this force was at this time in the air searching for the Vittorio Veneto, and eventually she was seen as she was attacking the British cruisers. The planes could see the position that the British cruiser force was in, but the planes were slow, they were making into a head wind, and Vittorio Veneto was making 30 knots away from them. After some little time they managed to make an attack which, although it caused no damage to the Vittorio Veneto, forced her to break off her engagement and turn to the north-westward, and Pridham-Wippell got away. He was also fortunate that the Italian gunners had not been better. He was completely unaware that he had been saved by the action of others.

The action which would now become a chase after the Italian battleship did not seem likely to have a successful outcome because the RN's older ships were further slowed each time the Formidable launched aircraft, since she had to turn into the wind, which was not favourable at this time. This disturbed the whole battlefleet which had to stay with her to maintain coherence. However, this was resolved and when the battlefleet met Pridham-Wippell's force the whole British fleet was now in pursuit.

 There were more air attacks on the Vittorio Veneto during the day and a second one from Formidable co-incided with one being delivered by the RAF. Iachino had been more worried about attacks from the air than any other danger and he was acutely aware that he was getting no defence from his own air forces. In the confusion of this attack the Formidable's aircraft got through the defences just enough to her hit with a torpedo. The time was about 15.10pm She at first stopped, but quickly repaired and eventually got up to 19 knots. 

A third attack on 28th March was ordered at dusk and this was to be successful in hitting the Pola, which was part of his screen, with an 18-inch torpedo, causing her to stop. Iachino did not hear about this immediately and did not know for 30 minutes. This was a major blow and he sent Fiume and Zara with four destroyers to assist and decide what was to be done. It was not realised the extreme danger ahead. The British plan had been to send destoyers forward ahead of the enemy and then make an attack in the morning. This plan was seriously flawed since the speed the Italians were steaming was seriously underestimated. The Italian main fleet continued as quickly as possible back to base. The British battlefleet meanwhile continued steaming north-westwards, without realising at this stage that the cruisers had unknowingingly turned towards them, until they were picked up on radar. At first the stopped ship was detected, which was assumed to be the Vittorio Veneto, but it was of course the Pola, and then the two cruisers. At about 22.20pm the battlefleet turned towards them.

The RN did not realise that it was to be such a one-sided fight however. The Italians had not the slightest idea that the British were anywhere near, and to make it worse they were in a state of total unpreparedness. The Italians had not trained for, nor even contemplated, night actions, which were not easy for either side, and in this case the Italians did not even have the turrets manned. Guns were trained fore and aft. The RN did not have much time to decide exactly what to do since they too were surprised by what confronted them, but the big guns from the battleships Warspite, Barham, and Valiant opened fire at point blank range, first on the Fiume. The broadsides crippled her and she was soon a wreck, and sank later. Next the guns were turned on the Zara and she met a similar fate, followed by the destroyer Alfieri. In the battle between destroyers which followed the Carducci was sunk. The others got away. The engagement with the cruisers lasted only about three minutes and the Italian ships were completely overwhelmed. Around 2,300 men lost their lives. The RN rescued sailors from the stopped Pola and from the sea and although the ships could not stay long enough in the area to rescue all in the water, a radio message was sent to the Italian Admiralty on 29th March 1941 who sent out a hospital ship. 

Whilst the Royal Navy had in the end only fought an element of the Italian strength, Admiral Cunningham's tactics were successful and an objective was secured, namely the removal of an enemy from the arena. The Italian Navy did not seek any significant confrontation with the Royal Navy during the remaining time Italy was at war. 

Notes about scenario
Scenario was meant to play as Italian,but you can play as British also.Some British units are upgraded to their higher standards to represent Radar speciality which were present at Matapan.Their higher AA values won't change anything cos there aren't axis planes in this scenario.That is all.


                                                     mario.kolic@eudoramail.com
 